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Law Students Go to the Movies II:
Using Clips from Classic Hollywood
Movies to Teach Criminal Law and Legal
Storytelling to First-Year Law Students
Philip N. Meyer with Catlin A. Davis

I. The Interpenetration of Law and Popular Culture: 20 Years Later
Over 20 years ago, I wrote about what I then labeled the “interpenetration”1
of law and popular culture. I borrowed the term from Buddhism. It struck me
then, as it does now, that the boundaries between legal storytelling practice
and popular storytelling practice are permeable; legal storytelling practice is
not autonomous. Although the aesthetics and conventions of legal storytelling,
including courtroom litigation storytelling, are somewhat different and adhere
to evidentiary rules and procedural constraints, legal storytelling is heavily
influenced and affected by popular storytelling, and vice versa. As a result,
the stories themselves inevitably bleed from one domain into the other: Legal
stories influence entertainment and art, providing the subject matter for
popular films, but simultaneously fictional literature, television programs, and
commercial Hollywood movies reverse-engineer the structure and aesthetics
of many stories told in the courtroom. Indeed, the narrative architecture
and substance of many popular stories, especially plot-driven Hollywood
entertainment movies (and, these days, perhaps long-form television serials as
well) profoundly influence many of the stories now presented in the courtroom.
In some types of cases, the ways that evidence is presented in the courtroom
and reconstructed in the jury room to fit verdict categories are intentionally
shaped to fit narrative templates prefigured by popular cultural stories. Just
as musicians typically borrow (and often steal without attribution) pieces of
melodies and lyrics from other songsters, effective litigation attorneys often
borrow shamelessly from popular culture (including movies, television,
advertising, entertainment, journalism, and literature).
Philip N. Meyer is Professor of Law at Vermont Law School. Catlin A. Davis was a law student
at Vermont Law School and is now a practicing attorney.
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These “framing” stories often embody or emphasize shared cultural
mythologies, notions of character, basic plot structures, and fundamental
understandings of how our world works. Storytelling in the courtroom is
sometimes shaped inside the shells of other framing stories, fitting together
like nested Matryoshka Russian dolls.
Beginning, perhaps, in complex evidentiary and high-profile litigation
of the second half of the twentieth century, excellent trial and appellate
attorneys—including recognizable figures such as Gerry Spence suing KerrMcGee, Inc. for punitive damages on behalf of Karen Silkwood,2 or Johnny
Cochrane defending O.J. Simpson3—drew intuitively and often intentionally
on “popular” stories and cine-myths that could be readily understood,
consumed, and digested by juries and judges.
New technologies employed creatively in the courtroom augmented this
approach, sometimes making trials look and feel more like the movies, radio
plays, and television programming. As techniques of presentation became
more sophisticated, stories from outside the law have migrated back into the
law—suggesting how evidence might be shaped and transformed into a story.
Years ago, scholarly acknowledgment of the interpenetration between legal
and popular storytelling seemed transgressive. But now it seems apparent
to many scholars, me included, that lawyers are, in large measure, popular
storytellers—truthful and meticulous storytellers confined to aesthetic and rulebound conventions and constraints, but popular storytellers nevertheless—
who can learn from the techniques of other professional storytellers.
Initially, in several law review articles, I went on an anthropological dig
into courtroom trials in Connecticut and into reviewing transcripts of famous
trials and arguments—“deep dives” exploring the interpenetration of legal and
popular storytelling practices.4
When I returned to the classroom, I incorporated storytelling practices and
popular stories (especially movies) directly into my doctrinal pedagogy. My
purpose, of course, was not to make my students into creative artists or film
critics. Rather, my decision to incorporate popular movies was based upon
my fundamental belief that it is important, initially, to provide courses that
emphasize legal storytelling and the interaction of “law” and “facts.”
Simply put, law school, especially the doctrinal courses during the first year,
tips the legally determinate and factually indeterminate world of most trial
2.

See Michael S. Lief, H. Mitchell Caldwell & Ben Bycel, Ladies and Gentlemen of the
Jury: Greatest Closing Arguments in Modern Law 119-58 (1998) (providing background
on The Estate of Karen Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Inc. trial and Gerry Spence’s closing argument from
the trial).

3.

See, e.g., Transcript of Record, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County
Jan. 25, 1995) (noting Johnny Cochran’s opening statement).

4.

See generally Philip N. Meyer, “Desperate for Love”: Cinematic Influences Upon a Defendant’s Closing
Argument to a Jury, 18 Vt. L. Rev. 721 (1994); Meyer, “Desperate for Love II,” supra note 1; Philip N.
Meyer, “Desperate for Love III”: Rethinking Closing Arguments as Stories, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 715 (1999).

Law Students Go to the Movies II

39

practitioners upside down. As Jerome Bruner suggested, litigation practice
is in many ways a literary enterprise, not an analytical science5; Langdell got
it wrong—lawyers are storytellers, and outcomes are often determined by
effective and truthful storytelling based upon the meticulous introduction,
presentation, and arrangement of complex factual evidence into stories.6
Consequently, as I wrote in this journal over twenty-five years ago,7 it is
necessary to shatter the formalist doctrinal shell that encases first-year law
students, and open students to an awareness of the complexity, singularity,
and maddening indeterminacy of “facts” and how, in turn, facts are shaped
into “stories.” To do so, I employ movie clips to teach doctrinal law and
expose students to legal storytelling practice. I cast students into various
legal roles, provide “the law” (statutes and cases), and then have the students
apply the law to the oftentimes slippery, complex, and typically ambiguous
facts depicted in the clip. Nothing, to my mind, better enables first-year law
students to understand and appreciate the interactions between law and fact at
the core of criminal law practice than this simple methodology.
In this essay, I explain how I use an illustrative visual hypothetical in my
first-year criminal law course. I have enlisted the assistance of a third-year
student, Catlin Davis, as commentator. Catlin was a student-consumer of this
pedagogy in my criminal law class during her first year. I asked her to write a
candid commentary about this representative cinematic hypothetical from the
course.
II. “The Watery Grave” from George Stevens’ “A Place in the Sun”
I employ a complex and ambiguous story sequence from George Stevens’
masterful “A Place in the Sun”8 (based upon Theodore Dreiser’s novel, “An
American Tragedy”9) as a review problem as we shift from studying the actus
reus (a voluntary act that causes the social harm set forth in a criminal law
statute) to the mens rea components of various crimes.
5.

See generally Jerome Bruner, Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life (2002) (exploring the
fundamental, dynamic relationship between law and literature).
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A. The Law
Before class, students review the California criminal homicide statutes
(excerpted in Joshua Dressler’s criminal law casebook10). We discuss the
elements of murder in California.11 Specifically, we analyze the definition of
malice aforethought (express malice and implied malice); this is the mens rea
element required for all levels of murder in California.12
I then cast students in the role of assistant prosecutors and assign them the
task of determining whether George Eastman can be charged and successfully
prosecuted for murder in California for the killing of his former girlfriend
Alice.

B. The Evidence
Poor boy George Eastman (Montgomery Clift) has come West to work
at his rich uncle’s factory. He is given a job on the factory line. He becomes
romantically involved with Alice Tripp (Shelley Winters), a girl who works
at the factory. She becomes pregnant; George is the father. George, however,
soon falls in love with the boss’s beautiful daughter, Angela Vickers (Elizabeth
Taylor). He visits with her at Loon Lake at the Vickers’ opulent summer home,
and they declare their love for each other. Unexpectedly, Alice comes to the
lake and demands that George marry her immediately or she will expose him
(and her pregnant condition) to Angela and to the Vickers family. George
agrees to marry her. But the marriage office is closed on Labor Day, and
George takes Alice on a picnic trip to a deserted portion of Loon Lake.
Does George have a nefarious murder plan in mind? He stalls out the car
some distance from the lake. (Is this to be the getaway car that cannot be
identified?) He lies about his name to the boat rental agent. He takes Alice,
who, he knows, does not swim and is profoundly fearful of water, out onto
10.

Joshua Dressler & Stephen P. Garvey, Criminal Law Cases
ed. 2016).
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implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when . . . the circumstances attending the
killing show an abandoned or malignant heart.”
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the lake in a small rowboat. (She grabs for him fearfully as she steps into
the boat.) The two then argue heading out onto the lake. George’s emotions
apparently swing in different directions to the accompaniment of a dramatic
musical underscore that, along with Clift’s acting abilities, strongly intimates
the ambivalence of what George is feeling (e.g., his hatred for Alice at one
moment, his sadness and remorse at another, and even his willingness to accept
the moral consequences of his acts resulting in Alice’s pregnancy). George
finally agrees to marry Alice. But Alice then declares that she knows George
does not love her, and that he wishes she were dead. She stands up in the boat,
and the boat tips over. George is next seen emerging from the water at a later
time. He is alone. Alice has, apparently, drowned.
Is this murder or merely a tragic accident? How do students “read” the
facts of the visual story? How do students analyze the mens rea and actus reus
elements of the crime of murder under the California penal statute and apply
these elements of the crime to the complex and ambiguous facts depicted in
the clip? What factual inferences can be plausibly made from the images and
dialogue?
C. The Legal Setup
Initially, I cast students into the role of assistant prosecutors. I ask whether
George can be prosecuted for murder (first-degree murder, second-degree
murder, or, perhaps, the lesser included crime of manslaughter) under the
California Penal Code. What arguments would they make? What stories
would they tell, based upon the facts depicted in the clip, to support their
legal analysis?
Here is a partial inventory of the issues typically raised in class discussions
as students attempt to fit together the interaction of law with the complex
and ambiguous facts, constructing persuasive versions of the legal story based
upon the evidence.
1. Mens rea: Does George have the mens rea of “malice aforethought”
required to prosecute him for murder? How is “malice aforethought” defined
in the statute? What “facts” indicate that he had malice? What are the facts
that seem to show that he did not? How do you make inferences based upon
the visual “cinematic” depictions of actions, and upon the characters’ spoken
words (dialogue)? What stories (plots) would you tell (construct) based upon
this evidence? If George, indeed, has malice aforethought, is it “implied”
or “express” malice? What is the difference? How does this legal difference
change the story told? Does it matter that he may have changed his mind and
decided not to kill Alice at the moment she falls into the water? Does this
change of heart extinguish or somehow mediate his liability? Can it even be
argued based upon the evidence that he “premeditated” and “deliberated”
the killing, and is therefore guilty of first-degree murder under the California
Penal Code? How might this legal argument be made and what story would
be told?
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2. Actus reus: Did George commit a voluntary act that caused the social harm
(the killing of Alice)? If so, what specifically was this act (these acts)? When,
specifically, did the act(s) occur? Is there a causal link between act(s) and
outcome? How would prosecutors make the argument about concurrence
between actus reus and mens rea? What, specifically, is the time frame of the
crime? Is George guilty of attempted murder, and if so, when? Didn’t George,
in the end, get precisely the result that he intended, even if events did not
happen the way he planned? Why does this matter?
3. More questions about causation: Did Alice cause her own death? That
is, were her own actions in the boat, which led it to tip over, the “proximate
cause” of her death, rather than George’s actions (or inaction)? Can the
defendant effectively make this argument (tell this story) based upon the acts
depicted on the screen? What is the prosecutor’s counterargument?
4 Alternative theories: Can George be charged with manslaughter? Voluntary
or involuntary? How many counts of murder/manslaughter can George
be charged with under the California Penal Code? (That is, can he also be
charged for the killing of the fetus?) Did George have a duty to rescue Alice
based upon his special relationship with her?
5. Prosecutorial ethics: Although this exercise is intentionally focused on
creative legal storytelling practice, and the interaction of law and facts, the
class inevitably discusses the “ethics” of charging decisions based exclusively
upon the “evidence” depicted in the clip, supplemented with the “back story”
of events in the narrative preceding the clip. Is there sufficient evidence at
this point to justify charging George with any crime? What further evidence
needs to be developed through additional investigation to prove these
charges beyond a reasonable doubt, confirming the narratives developed in
the exercise?

D. Telling the Story
I ask students acting as prosecutors to try telling specific portions of the
story to a jury in a “mock” closing argument. What would their theme be? How
would the plot be sequenced and constructed? I also ask: What additional
evidence would you like to introduce at trial to support the prosecutor’s
version of the story, and how would you employ this evidence in your closing
argument? What counterstory do you anticipate that the defendant’s attorney
will tell? What additional evidence do you anticipate that the defendant’s
attorneys will introduce at trial supporting their version of the story? How
would you respond to this evidence?
This exercise is effective as a simulation because of the complexity of
“facts”— seemingly infinite and conflicting interpretations (inferences) may be
made based upon the images depicted on the screen that can be shaped into
compelling and truthful stories.
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III. Catlin Davis’s Commentary on “The Watery Grave”
“The Watery Grave” provides a deep reservoir of content for our assistant
prosecutor roles. Its countless ambiguities affect many elements of the different
homicide crimes. To successfully charge George for Alice’s death, we must
craft the facts in a way that plausibly demonstrates each element of the crime
in question. Moreover, to convict George, we must convince the jury of each
element beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, to fulfill our assistant
prosecutor roles, we must transform the film’s ambiguous facts into a cohesive
and persuasive story that the jury will find compelling. Arguing that George
may have killed Alice will not be enough to convict him.
My classmates and I approached this exercise from diverse perspectives
based on our intuitions, gut feelings, and understandings of an assistant
prosecutor’s duty. Some people hoped to convict George of the most severe
crime possible because they believed he was guilty, or because they thought it a
prosecutor’s job to bring the harshest charges possible. Other students aspired
to remain objective; they hoped to learn the true crime George committed. And
still others believed in George’s innocence and wanted to avoid applying any
of the statutes to his situation.
Despite our knee-jerk responses, most of us evaluated George’s potential
guilt in the same systematic fashion. We started with the most extreme homicide
crime, first-degree murder, and explored the likelihood of proving all elements
of this crime at trial. Can the facts be framed, organized, and revealed in a
way that will convince the jury that George killed Alice willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation? After analyzing the likelihood of convicting George
of first-degree murder, we moved to the second-most severe crime, seconddegree murder, and repeated the same analysis until we had analyzed George’s
potential guilt under all of the California homicide crimes. In the end, most of
us chose to charge George with the crimes supported by our best stories, the
stories we found to be most true.
Some students, however, pushed themselves and chose to pursue a charge
that required a more creative story, or a story that they knew would be harder to
make the jury believe. These students wanted to test their persuasive powers.
They wanted to see if they could push themselves to craft a narrative of the
case that supported a first-degree murder charge, even if the story for seconddegree murder or voluntary manslaughter might be easier to tell. Despite
my choice to pursue charges that fell within the narrative I found to be most
“true,” or most reflective of George’s actual guilt, I am not opposed to my
classmates’ alternative approach. Just because one story may be more unlikely,
or more challenging to convince the jury to believe, does not necessarily mean
that it is less true.
Class discussion flourished as we explained, debated, and tried to persuade
our peers to appreciate our charges and narratives concerning George’s guilt.
Based on the different facts students highlighted, George appeared callous
and calculating one minute and then frightened and confused the next. People
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heightened his culpability by highlighting his deceitful acts (stalling out the
car and signing with a pseudonym when renting the boat), or they downplayed
his guilt by highlighting his redeeming acts (George accepting his fate and
resolving to marry Alice). Most of the discussion about which crime George
should be charged with boiled down to our evaluation of George’s intent.
We fought over the mens rea George possessed by basing our arguments on
different inferences derived from the facts.
As we continued crafting our complex stories of the case to adequately
address the film clip’s different legal issues (questions of mens rea, actus
reus, causation, etc.), many of us reflected on our adversarial court system.
We returned to our initial knee-jerk reactions concerning the purpose of
prosecuting George and our personal opinions regarding his potential guilt.
We remained unsure whether we as assistant prosecutors were supposed to
craft the most persuasive story for the strictest punishment possible, and let
the defense tell the story of an innocent George, or if we were supposed to tell
the true story of George’s guilt by charging him with the crime we found most
objectively reasonable. I want more rules to guide the story crafting process
so I will know I am telling an appropriate story that is fair to George, to the
court, and to Alice.
Ultimately, the in-class exercise of charging George allowed us to use
our creativity in class—an uncommon occurrence during the first year of law
school. Significantly, the exercise also helped us realize the seriousness of
crafting stories for our clients. With George, we were playing with fictional
facts and with fictional people. Yet someday in the near future, many of us will
find ourselves engaging in this same narrative crafting, but with real clients
facing real punishments.
IV. Conclusion
Numerous visual hypotheticals derived from popular movies can be
employed to teach many of the various subject matters in the basic first-year
criminal law course, emphasizing the complex interaction of law and fact
and introducing students to the art of legal storytelling. These “clips” and
storytelling exercises do not replace the traditional doctrinal coverage in
the course, but serve as a complement to the cases. The visual hypotheticals
and storytelling exercises make the classes come alive. And I cannot imagine
teaching this course without them.

